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SUMMARY OF AvSER PROGRAM 
The fallowing repozts highlight ~ o m e  of the work aecomgli~hed by the Aviation 
Safety Engiaucring a d  Rcocarch Division of the Flight Safety Foundation e k e  
the laat repod to the NASA Committee: on A i ~ ~ e r a f t  Operating Problems on 
detail8 may bc paovided upon request or the reports themselves may be obtained 
f rom AvSER, 
Aceident investigation procedures involve elsbknatee or judgments ob damage 
to %ha ailrcrtaft, 
aelevansc to ceash injury 8taadie8 is the reduction in volume OS the occupiable 
areaL, St  has been prropoeod that a panel of anolystrs, working from photographs, 
could provide mom accurate and reliable c8tfmatsss of such chanaetc~intics than 
would a tsiingle f i d d  investigator working under uncontrolled conditions. 
One a s p e t  of these poetcrash obeervatioaa of particular 
The 
present study exarninea she fcasibiRity of making judgmoatts of vollumc reduction, 
a t h e e  dimensislad problem. from two dimensional sepzresantativcs of objects, 
and ammptw to idcntiiy tho perceptual Paetoasr that might 'inheace such 
judgjrnmts,, 
Hypothe~e5 ragaadirzg the role in  BUS^ a task of such facturei as number and 
angular disparity of phstographs, %ha stimulus complexity ti. e.. a damage 
eharPac&atrPistioaj crt the obdast, the geometric propatios of the intact object, 
in a labonadory E;%udy in which E79 college atudcnts judgod from photogaaphrr the 
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. .  1 .  Con.s.idF:ration bt: given to the installation of: a suitable roll-over 
S S . . C C U C ~ I . ~ ~ : ~  in all HU-1.A aircraft $0 prevent the roof etructure from 
I 
c ojlapsmg 1nt.o t : : ~  ct, cupicd area of the aircraft. 
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n 
dcsjgn and fabricat %on of nonejectios-type crew seats currently utilized in 
Army ai~crad F ~ X P  analyzed, Ttrp a-nalysia wab made in light ob accident 
experience with this seate human toleFanca as presensly known, and accelcra- 
tions and f o r c e s  whach may be anticipated in accident6 involving Army aircraft. 
The anzlysis sevcaled that the strength requirements quoted in current 
military npcfficatinns a m  considerably Iowctr than 
dictated by the upper li~nid of accelerations which can be tolerated by the 
those which would be . 
-. 
oeenpmte (P: the arats  and (2) the accelerations and fOrCt?f5 that are aoaociattd 
wirb Army a i s c  r a f t  accidents, This  subctantiates the observation by the Army 
That these B C ? ~ Z B  fail under relatively moderate accident conditions, thus 
sub;e:etinq the occupant to further hazacds, especially in increased contact 
inju rae 3 c 
Gn ?,he basis  of the datailed examination of current specifications, human 
tslt:rance, and impact acceleration data, it is recommended that the crew 
brat epeeifitations be rsvised and that dynamic load factOre of 25C for 0 .  20 
r:ecog~d pl im 45G f o r  0 10 fiecond, meamred in the pelvic region of a suitable 
. .  
0 C.' 
p 
, *- . .  
b s y ~ t e m ,  and the occnp2.322ci rautxaint system ehould, individually 
aad in combination, be capable oL rnaintaiahg 2% for 0,  20 
second asld 45G for 0,10 second in the pelvic region of a 
suitable anthaoprnozpbic dr~mriry having a wsigbt and ma89 
&si;ziBu%ion of that of tiis heaviest occupant expected, PPO- 
is permissible provided (1) coniplete failure aild (2) subsequent 
ia~$irious situations do not occurG 
8 y 1 f ~ m ~  and the occupant; restraint system should, in combina- I 
tion, be capable of continuously maintaining 25G f SG, in the 
pelvic kegion of the dummy described in (a) aboveu while - 
deformink through at least 12 inches of vertical travel with 
respect to the airframe aad, where possible, up to  15 inches or 
more of vertical travel. 
AvCIR EZctp~~~t NoG 62-23, Bylb amic Test of an Aircraft Litter Installation, 
This ~ c p o ~ * t  presents an analysis of the crashworthiness characteristics of a 
standard liQter/patienQ restraint system as installed in a helicopter: which was 
subjected to a dynamic crash test.. 
On I. 2 September 1962, ,Aviation Cr'ash I @ ~ r y  Research conducted a dynamic . 
-, 




litter support straps, A high-speed camera was positioned in the heli- 
copter to record the action of the litter installation duriak the crash scquc~ce. 
Although the crash was cansidered to be survivable, the litterlpatient PC- 
&Paint ays3arn failed completely, The details of the Pailuses ape discussed; 
and it is concluded that the military specifications covering litter/patient 
restraint systems are not realistic and,, therefore, litter/patient restraint 
systems produced in accordance with these specifications do not provide 
adequate pxotection fop the occupant under moderately 8evert,, but potentially 
eui*vivablea crash conditione. 
Based on the information contained in this report, it ia,  concluded that 
military specifications pertaining to litter/gatiant restraint systems do not 
require sufficient: strength to provide protection for the occupants in certain 
potentially survivable accidents, 
Based on the foregoing conclusion, it ie recommended that: 
1. A thorough investigation be initiated to develop realistic design 
criteria for litter/patient restraint system@. 
2, Additional tagting of litter/patient restraint'systems consist of 
tests of the entire assembly as contrasted with the tecsting of 
single components, 
AvCiR R e p ~ ~ ’ c  NCL 62-25, Dyllamic Test of a COnMerCial-Type Passenger 
Scat Installation in an W-21 Helicseer. 
- ~ ~ 
This report presen2s an analysis o€ the craslworthirress characteristics of 
a commercial helicopter passenger Beat as installed in a helicopter which 
was subjected to a hll-scale dynamic crash test. 
OA 12 Skpiembelr 1962, Aviation @rash Injury Research conducted a dynamic 
crash test of an H-21 helicopter under contract to the U. S. Azmy Trane- 
poritatioa Research Command. Included among several personnel restraint 
systems tested in this experiment was a prototype passenger seat built for 
a commercial helicopter. The two-passenger ioEward-faciag seat wa8 
occupied OR the aisle side by an anthropomorphic d u m m y  and on the wall 
side by sandbags designed to simulate a second passenger. 
, 
The dwnmy was instrumented by accelerometers installed in the pelvic area. 
These accelesomefers were arranged to permit recording of the impact 
decelerations in the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions, A tensiom- 
eter in the dummy’s seat belt recorded eeat belt force. A high-speed camera 
recorded the action of the seat and occupant during the entire crash sequence. 
1 .  
’ The: seat maintained its structural integrity to the exteqt that a properly 
belted occupant would have been retained both in the seat and in the original 
location in the cabin. However, large displacements of the arms, legs, and 
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$0 $ 3 ; ~  n:?,;t, inply<ing severe 
>'-I F k P  dummy 
- -  * r ,  
. c  , 8 > '  , ' 2  -2;*~?3,?:~:;7 would have 
_ _  1 .  * *  ~ p c - 1 ,  :;;% i! \-?- j ! , ~  '; i i i t ~ * < I ~ ~ ~ ; , t ~  in,]" i:y whsfi sustaiiled under conditions of 
0 ~ ; i m i m  snpport, a condioicn not met in this test. 
Based on fkc data pxcscnted in this report, it is  coacluded that: 
1, This commcacial passenger seat probably incorporates sufficient 
zrtrezgth to provide retention in potentially survivable crashes of 
the: t ype  de~csibed in thia report. 
2, In this test, tho floor immediately forward of the test seat 
buclded in such a way a8 to provide some longitudinal support 
for the seat. only further testa or actual experience with the 
seat in accident situations will allow ;valuation of the seat with 
respect to ability of the seat to withstand longitudinal accezerationa 
when uns upporied, 
' 
t 
3, Flailing of the extremities of the d u m m y  occupant occurred to 
an extent suggesting that injurious contact with other seat structures 
would have occurred had such seats been present. 
4, The aiale leg of the seat is quite rigid and may constitute a hazard 
to the occupant under high vertical decelerations due to its inability 
I " -  
to deform or to absorb energy, . .  
5, The decslaratione experienced in this potcntially survivable crash 
would probably have caused failure of the wall attachment tube if 
13 . 
1. The idding leg of the conunercial passenger seat be redesigned 
to incorporate energy absorption capability to reduce peak vertical 
ac c e la rat ion I 
2, The attachment of the seat to the wall of service aircraft be 
capable of developing the full potential of the eeat. The standard 
troop seat attachments in the H-21 are inadequate from this stand- 
, point. 
3. Additional reetraiats in the form of shoulder harnesaee be installed. 
4. Provision be made for reducing injury throiagh contact of the lower 
extremities with the I rear main beam of the seat in all installations 
involving tandem seating. 
AvGSR Report NO, 62-26, Personnel Restraint Systems Study - HC-1B 
Vert01 Chinook. 
This report presents detailed recommendation8 for the improvement of the 
personnel restraint system ia the U. S, Army HC-1B aircraft. 
recommendations pertain primarily to strengthening the existing restraint 
The 
syetem components. The modifications proposed indicate the following 
strength improvements: (1) Cockpit - The crew's restraint system ie 
increased from an 8-12G value to a 25-30G value, (2) Troop Compartment 0 
The troop's lap belt attachme~ats are increased from a 10-15G value to a 
14 
This report inclwks the, f a ~ o w i n g  inforzhation: 
I ,  
2, Parts Psoeurernen3 - De$ailed engineering drawings with a . 
Enginderiiag - Stseng"rh b a l y s i s  of proposed modifications. 
hill of materials from which retrofit kits can be procured. 
Parts Manufacture - Drawinpa necessary for the manu€acture 
of retrofit kits .,
3, 
4, Retrofit f i t  %nstallatior?. - Suffi,cient drawing8 for installation 
of the zetsotit kits by &MY personnel. 
5, Administrative - A cost and weight summary of proposed 
modifications" 
. AvGIR Eteprt No,, 62-27, Personnel Reetraint Systems Study - HU-3A and 
HU- 1 D Bell ITOQUO~R, -
This repst p e n e a t s  detailed recommendations for the improvement of the 
persoanel restxaitxt system in the U, S, Army HU-lA and HU-1B aircraft. 
The recowendations pertain primarily to strengthening the existing restraint 
system components. The &modifications proposed indicate the following 
atran.gth improvements: 11) Cockpit - The crew's restraint eyetem is in- 
creased froLm a 10-12G value to a 20-256  valueo (2) Troop Compartment - 
The troop's lap belt attachments are increased from a 12-15G value to a 
22-256 v ~ I u ~ ,  
15 





Engineering - Strength Analysis of proposed modifications. 
Part8 Procurement - Detailed engineering drawing@ with a 
bill of materials from which retrofit k i ts  cam be procured. 
Parts Manufacture - Drawings neccesary for the manufacture 
of retrofit kits. 
R e f a ~ f i t  1.t hatallation - Sufficient drawings for installation 
of the rctxofit kitla by Army peasonnol, 
Administrative - A eost~ and weight summary of proposed 
modifications 
' ,  
AwCR R e p s t  No, 62-28,' Mew Technique8 for Assessing Damage from 
Age idest XanPerrkigatioas 
'This was a paper prepared for presentation at the Flight Safety Foundation 
Iaternational Air Safety' Seminar held in Williamsburg, Virginia, during . 
December 1962 by'Dt,. Lee Gregg,  
The purpase of the paper was to present new techniques in aseeesing damage 
rt 
from aircraft accident investigations in an effort to improve ways of dc- 
tesmining the time sequence of physical events which OCCUT during and 
I 
immediately following a crash. 
L 
Di~cuseed are the use of concepts borrowed from the field6 of psychology, 
mathematlC8, and systems engineering as they are being applied to this area. 
AvCIR Report No. 62-30, Discussion of the Postcrash Fire Problem. 
This was a paper prepared for presentation at' the Flight Safety Foundation 
XntePPraLional rhiv Safety Seminar,, Decem&= 1962, at WUliarnsburg, 
Virginia, 
The purpose of the paper was 00 present possible solutions in solving the 






Fire herzing Systeme - AvCIR's experience in this field - a 
conclusiosr that accep$abfe fire inertiag systems are feasible 
and would reduce the incidence of %ire by a significant percentage, 
Containment - Application by installation of crash- resistant fuel 
tank bladders 
Breakaway Tanks - AvCIR'o expezieace in this field - a conclusion 
that the concept is sound and its uee on certain aircraft would 
reduce the occurreace of fires. 
, 
Solidification of Fuel - A relatively new concept - experimental 
work need for determination of feasibility and practicality. 
AvClR Report No. 63-lp An Operational Test Qf a Fire Inerting System foi 
Helicaptc re. 
Thie report describes the theoryr development, and test of a fire inerting 
aystem for helicopters. The feasibility of constructing a light weight system 
17 
2, A lare inezirking system for helicopters ehould be in operation 
witbin'o,, 20 aecrsnd or leos after f i r a t  impact. 
2, A l i t h e  to operate11 of 0-20  second can be attained in an operatioaal 
fixe ixzerting Byatem, 
* 
* 
3, A fire iaerting system can bu installed in a 10,000-pound aircraft 
with as little as 80 pounds increase in overall weight including 
coolant, 




Continuance of this etudy should be made with the turbine engine 
since tho primary Bource of power in many present day and most 
future production helicopters is the turbine engine. 
An operational electrical de-energizing system be developed, 
Thie system must provide for  safety while in normal flight, yet 
uhould be simple and afford maximum protection to the aircraft 
occupants in an emergency situation, 
A simple but reliable opexatiolral fire-inerting- system triggering 
device or initiator be developed, 




The feasibility of using a flame retarding hydraulic Duid be in- 
vestigated. 
Techniques that will improve €uel containment be investigated 




The €easibility of  utilizing special surfacing to increase the 
surface ignition temperature in operational eystems be evaluated. 
For exampleo when metals a re  surfaced with certain compounds-, 
e. go platinum, their temperature must be raised an additional 
300 to 700 degree8 F. to provide igaition, 1 
A study of the nature of fuel spillage patterns in helicopter accidentr, 
and their effect upon ignitiolr' source and ignition delay, be ma& 
to provide a better understanding of the helicopter postcrash fire 
problem. 
Control linkage tubes located in sones of the aircraft subject to 
in-flight fires ehould be constructed of steel o r  material possessing 
good strength at elevated temperatures. 
1 
19 
. .  
;vith other eqquipxnent in €uU acalls crtawhes of CH-21 hclicoptezm. 
seat w a s  teated um 12 September 1962 and the seccrmd on 19 April 1963. The 
?cet - :  were condrasteci by Aviafioax Safety Engineering and Research (IAvSER) 
The first 
\ .  
sndc B contract to the U, S, Army Trrawportation Reticarch Command. 
The seats acpreacntcd two steps in the development of a troop eaat ueing a 
str'uL type of energy attenuation. The seats were eingle pa8scngellte side- 
faGillg,, buck& scatrs. 
'the *:eats and reatrained by lap bcnlte and erinrgle diagonal chest straps, 
Fbr the test, aathPQpoMOhphiC dumnnica were placed in 
Acet.lanomnctsrr% were mounted in the pelvic cavity of the dummies and arranged 
fo gcrmit recording of the impact deeeleitatioas. Tcwt~iometcrs were mounted 
38 the seat belts to record the belt foztccs.. Xigh spccd cameras positioned 
in tb.c heB%copters rceo;rdnd the reactions of the duminiee J A ~  experimental . 
The mats w e r e  divided into two basic Punctional units. Firsat, a scat base 
3eccr3do an occupant enclosure which, in addition to the lap belt and chest 
3fra.?,, was designed to provide the occupant with raatraiat in thc lateral 






absorbing s u p p x t  s h u t ,  even usdcr conditions of SCIC~~O Qoor crushing. 
Tmpm attention mwt be gives1 to attaching trPoop seats to aircraft 
bxeis  bjrtsuctaire by methods compatible in stace'ngth to the strength of 
the mat, 
'2holnc is a definite tendency Porr the occupant to submariane when the 




Baarcd on the foregohg eonclusiom, it was recommended that: 
l o  Steps be taken to begin procuEemcnt and in$tallatioa of a seat bamd on 
bhie energy ab hing strut concept in operational Army hdkOpt8If8~ 




3. 4 more po&%ive restraint syatem such as a crotch strap be utilized to 
keep the ossupan% from eubrnariniag. 
i . 
rirtrame deformations which reaultcd, ;is well a8 photographs of typical 
Based on the data papassated in %hi& repart, it ia concluded that: 
1, Ahhough S B Y C F C ~  bhiw crash waha potentially eurviwablc, from 
the otandpint'of irnpaet, ainee the occupiable area8 of the 
, aircraft remained reasonably intact, 
than this test, This mean8 that an extreme fire hazard'exists 
in H - t f  accidents of this natuze, 
f 
% 0x1 the basis of testa conducted to date, the upper fuselage 
icbidanta' which involve a high vcstical component of acceleration, 
22 
relative bo impact aeedsaation has been collleetad arc a8 bofhws: hazard 
~ Z X ~ O B U F ~ ,  crash loadsD hum= tolerrancee, deoigm, and tcs&/anialyeir 
i%3wevdfe, the scores of peasoanal centactbe made throughout the imdustry 
cbrhg the p r e g ~ m  and the study of the cbeaunantsp thamsdvers plpovided a 
g.,csrcra% inGaigh8 iabo the aatien'ss technology h impact acceleration xclated 
" '3 
B is coacaudcd that: 
1, TBc SXAT program provides a MU& aaedad inventory of 
kxfiowlerlgc of the impact accalesraion phase of  clradih iduay 
prevention. It provides not only a technical information center 
. .  8% 
I 
being collected at a faster rote than people can assalyze and 
amem the aceparacy of the &%a, yet the! effect8 of variations in 
Jreskraizt BlPotezn configuration, goai&%oniaag, and tiglhtaees are 
vi Hual ly ,une~p10rc d., 
LitRle if any 5pcrciLic publiahsd data are available relatiarc to 
tradeoff& between weight, safetyl and coat corncorning mat dotsign- 
A vezy encouraging trend exbats to attack the problem of Crra8k 
load determination aaalytically as wclf aa through full-@ealt 
tagabs or through derivation of data from actual accidents. This 
ia srignifieaapt Prom an economy point ob wieww* skree it allowrr 
flexibility in design %car cracshwodainesa caxRy in an afreiraft'a 
development, This field, however, has o d y  been probed, with 
the teaults meriting caocec scrutiny as to theirr immediate value, 
A degree of mpllaannrsd duplication of effort has exioted between 
various agencies as well as occaeional lack ob communication 
within a given agency iEselS sot t o  what aeecareh i i  being done arcd 
by whom, Aa a simplified example of this, thcac could be much 
prpogrpcrsss made in the collection and coordinattoa of craah idury 
data from aecidante through the eaepcdiant of using the same or 
24 
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Jt i s  recommended that: 
Bnvu%v.ed in aviation craah injury prsvcrrtiow. 
'I .' . .  . .  
t .  , .  
... : . .  . . :  .. . 
coordination, 
, %  The craeh injuzy bibliography and information retrieval syetcm 
devdoped in thiar study be refined and expanded to include other 
jlacebd~ oJC the gurvival problem, such as lire prevention and control, 
emergency evacuationy reweuclsurviwal, and tho many other 
. .  
... .: 
. .  
. .  
- .  . 
. .  . . .  - . .  
. .  
. .  
stscsrscss iahcsent in the crash episode in addition to aeccloaation. 
Additional ~ i io~l t .  be made in como1at;Zoar and inforpaetation of 4, 
. .  
the idomation acquired in thier study to provide meanjngful data 
. .  
bo tbc syssteme rnanagw, the designer, and the UBOE. Spcsifically, . .  
consideration should bo given to ihc areas of additional study 
relative g o  crash injury prevention as dehoclribcd in ghc Evaluation 
* \ '  . .. 
. .. 
. .  
' ..* 
of ary body restmint at the moment of the crash, 
. .  . ... 
. .  .. 'The inxe8tigation revealed Phc need for  increased protection for the sockpit 
uccupantss in the losm of shotddek Bagweesess attached to baais structure, It :* . 
was also noted that an exeeseava amount of time (about 15 minutes3 was require4 
bo e\-aeuabc the aircraft. 
ai BC ta4t by: 
' 
. . .  . . .  .  
- .  
. : *  
. 
. .  
The passengess were hampered in evacuating the . .  
. .  
. .  
1, Bisszientatien a8 a result of @eat failures, 
. .  
* .  . 
2, Lack of erncrgency illumination. .. . 
3, Xnaeeessibility of cmcrgensy exitb;, - :  . 
. .  
.. . 
Pa5semges seat anchazagcs be increased in strength by 
meam of the modification recommended in this report. . 
Comidesation bc given to the addition of an emergency 
lighting uystam, and to  the pcactiee of preflight 
amergsnczy briefingw. , 
Crew ecat anchorages be reinforced a% indicated. 
26 
+: . . .  . .  . . .  
.* . .  
,* ' . 
. .  
. *  . 
. ... . '  . .. . . . .  - .  
. .  
. '  ' . .  
' *  
a .  
. .  ,. . . .  . .  
. .  . 
8 .  
6 .  . _. 





4, The pautcr~ger scats be modified to include a diagonal tcsesion member 
LH discussed in $he latexior Darnage Section 0% this rcpost. 
The ticdown ri,,reegth of htmaor equipment be made at least equal 
to $.Are stmxtgtlra of the personae1 restraint systerne,. 
. 
* 
5 .  
7. All. passengers be briefed on emergency evacuation pzoccdusea before 
each Qbght, 
8,  An e m c r g e x y  illumination eystsrn bo instalfed in the airezaft a8 
recpircd by the "Handbook OX Inatructions For Aircraft Designers 
28 
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. .  .. . *L.  ne nb,jcatiuc of this 9fudy i g  t o  determine significant indices of csanh- 
* I  
which an a i ~ 3 w e ~ :  is m l x g h t  i a  ~imlp.Iyc How may propscd changes in . . e  ! 
* * . .  1 
i a given r q t x t a ~ t ~ . ~ : ~ , ,  intended Po increase cnashwosthincse, be avduated 
! 
! . ' 1  
" * .  4 
. .  
these indices dahould scrye to point diirections of potential improvement 
in a given st~uetural design. 
. 
. .  , .  . ,  
i 
Structural changes that alter the ,poaaibiAity of improved csadshwolrthiness 
might take the form of any 0% the falllowing: 
. .  
1, 
2, 
General e$x=cngthening of a given bay to incacaee it8 collapse load, 
Increase in enesgj-ahsocption casacity of a given bay' without 
A ~ C Q S S Z ~ ~ ~  changing the colllaprae load, . ' 
. '  i . .  
i 3. General geometric changeis,, 8UCh a8 lengthening a bay or reloeating " .  . , 
1 i cabin., 
1 * .  
i 
3 
1 .  + 
. * -1 
. .  4, Change in component deruign, such as change in main landing gear i 
type; 
5, Seat or seat tie-down chaagee, 
. . . .  
. .  
.. ' . .  . .  
. .. * j (  
i 
1 '  '* 
i p  




! .  
6, Miwolr structural changes = changing a single tube. or addition 
of a brace, 
7, Changes defjigaed to reduce effective mass of aircraft upon impact. 
. .  .. . . . .  . .  
. .. 
. . .  
* . .  
. .  . .  
. '  . .  . .  
* '  
, . * .  
I *  
' . +  1 
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i 
to increase cabin strength or perhaps produce 
a moke favorable naode of csllapse. 
Each of them is eonsidezed separately in this xepol~t, in the ligh3 of the 
analysis and coxngutations made, 
In summary, the pz-eliminasy study reveals that the crashworthiness 
seZetfod are potentially ua0hZ 
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, . .  
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I .  
Tzr thily d)mramic= teat ehe r e s u k . ~  obtained with an anthropomorphic dummy 
w c w  corroborated by the data oboainad from an animated dummy of approxi- 
* .  . .  
matclly ithe aame proportions; herein referenced to a& a ten-anaut. The a * .  . .  . .  
IWO dwnrniea W R ~  restrained by a lap bedt and shoulder a t a a p ,  
were moun%cd to rbsesd accaXcsakions in the occupants and the seats.. 
Accclesornete$g. :. 
. -  
. - .  * . .  
e .  Tsnsiomobara W ~ F C  mounted to record belt forces, A high a p e d  camera 
. .  rPeco&ed the action during the crash S ~ X ~ X A C ~ ,  
i . .  . 
.. 
a .  
. I -  
. .  Thc seats were prototypas sf €he CFCW kcate U B C ~  in the UH- 1 A series of 
helicopters,, l?iCol?poaa&hg modifications ;LR callad out in AwSER soport 62-27, 
: '* .  : 
Pertijenael Rshataairbt Systema Study - WU- 5 A and HU- 1 B 8~1.3 hOqM&?. (. . . 
.. . . I  
The tes t  rasutte rrhowed that the modified XH-40 &eat@ cam be expecked 
to maintain proper posiiion and o;ricxlbafion during a devere yet Purvivsblc 
crash?, 
. .  
. . ?  
i .  
The mat paam of the mats,, however,, are not eufiicicnely strong i . . .  
to r e  siet high vertical decelerations, particularly wbcn combined with 
- .  
. .  . e .  
! 
I .  
I 
. .. . .* . . '  . .  
. .  , * .. 
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* -  
when cornpa-cd with a dumamy with noan-rigid app%iagca. The aubaequcnt 
*: .. * , 
. 5 .  
. :. . 
. .. 
... . 
. ,  . . .  .. . .  
. '.. .. . 
* '.' 1 
* .  , 
. . *. . i .. 
I .  
.. . . 
.. * . .  . .  
.- . ... . . .'. 
. . *  .. , .  
enough to withstand the RtreaseB from high vertical 
decohration c ~ a s h e 6 ~  
The euhanaaining action meullting from the failure of the 3- 
. .  
seat pan and the longitudinal decelesaEionar negate a good 
postion of the etrcngth capabiAities of the Beat, 
Aldcason anthropomorphic dummies offer reasonable 
, 
,Q. 
: .coirsdation with non-rigid eyecimcasl during the initial 
C. e .  . .  
. .  impact ob a dynamic 'rest, 
arc such howevez,, at subsequent raadings arc not 
The response sharaeteaktic'e . .  . ' .
. *  . 
.* . 
zealistic when compared Eo amn-rigid test s&tcirnemrr. 
I . . .  
. '. . .  
, '  
: .  
. .. 
Baaed on the: Borcgoing C O A C I U B ~ Q ~ S ,  if: wars rceommondcd that: 
. .  
. .  . . 1, S t e p  bc taken to implement the changes rocornmcndcd in , 
. . a  .. 
'.. 
a .  
'I . .. , .  . , 
c . ..' . 
AvSER 62-27 in tbc Army's t'loct of UH-1 type helicopters. 
I *  
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1 0j ? 
" e  - 
i a  abtaimd Xsom various source8 &a maintain this ~crhcdule, It would be 
. .  . .  . . '  
¶ .. .. 
* ' .  . ;  
* .  . .  
* . .  
5 
.. .. . 
. .  
, .. , . .  
' . .  .. . 
' I  . . . * I  
. .  
. .  .. appisciated i% ala members of tire NASA Committee would provide UB 
wilk Jkeia ideas for the Rceiga.i%crnos on the baasis of their patat experience. 
. .  :. . 
* * '  . 
. .. . 
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, _  
was accomplished by candare~ing a ga.sdinc fire, utilliain8 %he H-21 helicopter 
w w c k a g e  of tha crash test vehicle (Test Ne.. 71, which was crashed on 
.I . . .. . 
* .  . .  
. .  
I .  
.. * . ... . 
Temperature iasttaurnents were imballad in the aircraft and ~ O D A ~ C ~ C ~  to aa . .  . .  
ofaeidlog!j.aph through am umbilical c a b h  pmtsctcd by ashrsboca pipe.. Ambient 
. . .  . .  . : . and ea8orimches temperatures were measured alb the ceiling and floor of the . .  
. : 
Structural temperatures WCFC a h  measured on the right and left hand eade of 
the aircraft in addition to cxtemal ambient temperatures. 
I '  
i 
i 
0 .  
.. . t 
. .: 
. .  
The gaR sampling srysttm dsaigwed for Test NQ" 6 waB utiliacd, and 30 gas 
in the cockpit,, o m  at mid-cabian ceilingy and one at mid-cabin floor. Ten gars 
BarsrpEss were obtained from each off the thaec abwc locations at the rate of . . .  
a .  
35 
dsurns on command, and the fuel wa8 ignited by an electrical signal: from 
the ground caatrel poisst~, 
The data obtairtcd isom this fire test i s  being analyaed and compared with 
the data obtsigsed f ~ o m  crash test No,, 6 which involved %he burning of an 
Orne of the interesting prelirninapy iimdisig~ og thii test is that tha cabin 
fusdage Ykin was consumed approarimately 75 percent by the fire after 
only 45 scsueda ob burning time w 2 h  only 23 gallons of total fuel involved 
Teat No, 9: On A8 April 1963 an ob;ra~lbta, fully inatrunrntcd H-21A hdi -  
eaptez was evaehed Pnom'actual fhight simulating a typicail crarsh. 
craft  was csatzoil8ed durina; flight through a radio link remote c~orn&r~~ Riyotcm 
developed fQE" Ehh ptwpoede.. 
The airpa 
The objective6 of this dynamic cratjh test were a8 foflowa; 





expc ximental pilot and pwseoengcr BCafa, litter inatallationa, 
seast #iedowa .structurep and other aircraft copnponente. 
b, To obtain acceleration a d  physiological data from &a animal 
aubjtcts and anthropomonphic dummies during the crash. 
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sprcd of 45 miles per houu, VcrtFcal velocity at impact was 52, 5 feet pea 
seetion of the aii6.c rat8 was csaaridcrad survivable, Although the furaclagc 
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* .  . .  
. Fuel, sp~Ilcd ZA a paitern which approximates normal lank riipfusing was 
iipatird 
Plrsoughout the scst ax-tick and the data was recorded, 
in g r o u p  OX ten, were insLalXcd next to tach of the three gae sampling inleta 
fox the ~ I W ~ O P E P  of measuring the asBirnilation sf carborn monoxide and other 
. . : , .  
i 
l'crnpc*j,-atux-e ais flow and air sampling inetrumeats were installed 
6. . . 
9. 
. .  .. Thirty white rate 
. .  
' * * .  
. .. . dangerous g a s s e . ~ ~  Each rat w a ~  eleetrocuted after a carreaponding mechanical.. . . 
8 . . .  .. 
gas sample was t + x ~  After the test filicir blood was analyzed and the result8 . . .  . 
are bej.tsg c:o:tzsl.atcti with tkc analpis of the gas samples, in order to determine '. 5 
. .  
9 .  the rate of aaairnilation of the toxic gassccl by the rat5 in relatiom to the . .  
.. :.. 
... p a ~ c e n t  of t.hosc: gasses in the almofiphsm at the predetermined intervals. 
Normal and high -speed cameras were iatiiitcd to record the action photographically 
* . .  
1 . .  
. ... . :. - 
* .* 
I .  . .. 
As a,side! experiment, once the interior of the test helicopter reached the 
nansurvivable limit, an 33-43 halicoper w a t ~  hovered into a fire fighting 
I .  
.' . 
position to dcte!s:imizle if Ifre downwash wasl capable of bringing the then exieting * . .  .. * 
.. 
e .  
.. . non-survivah!e eavironrnaart back to a ffurwivabk cnvironrment, The r e e u h  of . ..I 
t h i ~  side experiment are as of yet not determined, 
. .  
. .  
. .  . .  . .  . .  .. 
* . .  Test NQ, I 1  :: 
ob the posts~ash Pire environment arJl related to O C C U ~ ~ Z I ~  survival in helicopter 
stlpucture. 
The sbjeetivot of t b i s  teat  waB to continue the qualrfitivc evaluation 
.. . 
..- 
.* .. . 
* .  
e C h  4 Sep?,cmber 1963, the test article was equippbd by utilizing 
e 
* .  
the xcpaiwd airesjcft iuselagc from Test Na 10, Fuel Bpilled in a pattern 
.* . . 
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I CRASH WORTHINESS 
The SITUATION I 
The HAZARD 1 
. .  
While making an  instrument let-down, the pilot flew the a i r c ra f t  inadvertently 
into sof t  ground in a wings-level, slightly nose-low attitude. 
The lower forward bulkhead dug into the ground, 
resulting in heavy plowing action and seve re  decel- 
eration. 
both front sea ts  failed and the occupants 
sustained fatal  head and upper torso injuries,  
.'. . 
. .  . .  
The sea t  belts and sea t  anchorages of 
. 
Blunt o r  square edges on the lower forward 
bulkhead may cause excessive gouging 
during low-angle accidents on un- 
prepared  surfaces  o r  in heavy, flat 
impacts  on soft ground. (Figures 1, 2). 
This is a common cause of high 
decelerations,  which may affect the 
integrity of the floor s t ruc ture ,  or 
the occupant tiedown chain and will 
bring the upper body of the c rew 
m e m b e r s ,  res t ra ined by a sea t  belt 
only, in violent contact with the con- 
t ro l s  and the instrument panel. 





. ,  
The "digging" action of the nose and forward fuselage section can be prevented 
by designing a clean, s turdy keel, forward of the main bulkhead o r  wing spa r ,  
curved to match the existing contours of the nose section-(Figure 3 ) .  
... 1 
. . '  1 
a .  I 
e . .  I 
I 
1 . . .  . 1 
a .  i 
. I  
. I  
. ,  
. I  . .  
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1 O C C U P A N T  RESTRAINT 
. . a  . 
. .  .  -1 
a ' .  . 
The shoulder harness in a current high-wing a.ircraft is attached 
to an inertia reel, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
between the reel and the shoulder straps, is ro~uted over a pulley 
the wing and the fuselage behind the occupiable 
. .  The attaching cable, . .  .. 
which is attached to a V-brace; the V-brace is attached between , .  
- 
area. Accident records have shown 
repeatedly that whenever the wings 
move forward and downward at 
impact, the braces a re  torn 
free (Figure 2). 
the shoulder harness pulley 
also moves forward and the 
"tiedown chaint1* is compro- 
mised to the extent taat it is 
. .  
. .  
As a result, 
should not be attached to aircraft 
structure which, because of its 
mass o r  location, can be 
expected to break free o r  
fail in a survivable type 
accident, but rather, should 
be tied to structure which 
can be expected to remain 
substantially intact in these 
type accidents. 
A designer can increase the crash protection 
of aircraft occupants in the initial design phase if 
the following principle is used as  a guideline: 
Links in the personnel "tiedown chain" 
. . t .  
*. 
I .  ' .  . ,. 
.. 
9 The "tiedown chain" includes all the components of the restraint system; 
the lap belt, the shoulder harness, the seat structure, the floor and 
all related anchorages. . .  
. *  
* .  .. 
. .  .. . 
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CRASH FORCE ATTENUATION t 
Protection Against Vertical Crash Loads . 
. .  e .  -TEmG-]  
.. . 
Four occupants of an aircraft received dangerous and critical spinal injuries .' 
of the dorsal and lumbar areas when their fully-loaded aircraft failed to . ' .. 
remain airborne after takeoff from a private strip. 
and impacted, with wheels retracted, in a flat attitude on the upgrade of 
The aircraft stalled \. 
* . .I 
* .. . .  '. . . a ravine, sliding to a stop in 30 feet. . *  
. .  
% *  
. .  
In accidents such as this , large forces a re  transmitted vertically through 
the floor and seat to the occupant. The situation can be further aggravated 
when the occupant is allowed to Itbottom out" through the use of a thick 
soft seat cushion. ... .( 
. . *. 
* .  . * .  * 
. . .  
CORRECTIVE ACTION I *: I 
. .  1 
* .  
The designer can exercise some control over the . .  
crask  force transmitted to the occupants through . I '  
the use of energy-absorbing material in the seat 
cushion. Several crushable materials appear to 
have promise, such as  treated paper honeycomb, 
I urethane and polystyrene foams; however, in 
order to utilize the ultimate benefits of these 
1 materials, their crushing strength must be 
1 closely controlled between 9 and 11 psi. If 
~ the strength is lower than 9 psi, the cushion 
does not offer maximum energy absorption; 
if the strength is greater than 11 psi, the 
occupant is likely to be exposed to high 
vertical forces and subsequent injury to the 
spinal column. The thickness of the energy- 
absorption material to be used will depend on 
the practical limit of the seat pan and cockpit 
geometry. 
' 
. .  
CONFORMING SURFACE7 * 
6" ENSOLITE OR EQUIVALENT. ' 
(APPROX. 5 LB./CU. FT . )  
. *  . .  
3. . . .  
COMFORT 7 
SOFT'FOAM RUBBER 
. .  
. .  
. .  
* '  
F I L L  MAXIMUM SPACE WITH 
. : 
.. 
